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Murphy's Law 
THE OLDEST SOCIAL SCIENCE? CONFIGURATIONS OF LAW AND 
MODERNITY by TIM MURPHY 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, 269 pp., £35.00) 
Law is a way of knowing as well as mastering what is known. 1 When law 
ceases to know, it ceases to be master. Exactly this has happened to the 
legal systems of modernity, says Tim Murphy in The Oldest Social Science? 
Configurations of Law and Modernity. Law has stopped knowing its subject, 
which is society, and thus no longer masters it. Murphy explores law as a 
way of knowing, the transformation in society making it largely impervious 
to law's way of knowing, and the ways of knowing that have elbowed law 
aside. It is a remarkable performance - rich in learning, teaming with 
aperftis, blessed with set-piece analyses (Max Weber's model of bureaucracy, 
the contribution of Christianity to Western legal culture, the common law's 
epistemology) of such surpassing beauty that it more than repays the effort 
to work through Murphy's sometimes taxing style. Yet his big-ticket thesis 
- that law no longer knows its subject and therefore cannot master it - is 
largely wrong. 
Murphy follows the legal sociology of Niklas Luhmann, in which suffi-
ciently differentiated societies dissolve into a congeries of self-reproducing, 
hence autopoietic networks of communication, each sustained by a distinc-
tive code. In Luhmann's vision, the modern legal system is just one sub-
system amongst many, each constantly irritating the others, each 
maintaining a boundary against the others as a consequence of the irrita-
tions. The social system has no centre, no hierarchy - or, more accurately, 
centre and hierarchy are themselves just images circulating in a series of 
communications. But law, unique amongst the sub-systems, assumes a 
centre and strives for hierarchy. Centre and hierarchy are the very logic of 
law's approach to society. That is why law can no longer know its subject, 
can no longer be master of society. 
This, Murphy argues, was not always so. Once (the ancien regime, the 
good old days, the Gothic constitution), society was transparent to law. 
Before disintegration into autopoietic subsystems, up to the early modern 
era, society organized itself according to law's logic. All this changed, 
however, in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when 
government started to take responsibility for the performance of the disin-
tegrated sub-systems, for the economy and social welfare. Then the new 
I The premier text on this is Plato's Laws. See especially 957c, where the Athenian associates 
law (nomos) with intelligence (nous). For the moderns, Lord Bacon, Novum Organum (ed. 
J. Devey, 1902) 11: 'Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the ignorance of 
the cause frustrates the effect; for nature is only subdued by submission, and that which in 
contemplative philosophy corresponds with the cause in practical science becomes the rule.'. 
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science of political economy began to compete with law as the dominant 
language of statecraft (pp. 126-32). This defeasement of law progressed into 
the private sphere in the twentieth century, with the emergence of auditing 
and the science of management. Law was once master, and because it was 
master, also what was mastered. Now the mass media and identity politics 
compete with it in the public sphere, and auditing, enterprise, and a sharply 
defined zone of privacy compete with it in the private sphere. 
These other ways of knowing and mastering the social system share a 
clear methodological disagreement with law, about what can be known and 
how one goes about mastering what one knows. Law knows qualities of 
soul and actions evidencing those qualities. Government by law is thus adju-
dication, the mastery of souls (p. 60). Law's competitors know statistical 
aggregates (pp. 124-5, 133- 9). Law masters souls directly through education, 
and indirectly, by assigning responsibility and punishment (Murphy nicely 
captures this regime with the phrase, 'the penetrative scheme and juridical 
soul', pp. 8-36). Law's competitors master statistical aggregates through the 
creation or revision of systems. Law's methods and aims are thus discordant 
with the reality created by the methods and aims of its competitors. Law is 
master in its own house, but many larger, more resplendent mansions, hous-
ing their occupants in greater luxury, have grown up in the neighbourhood. 
What role does law play in a Luhmannian world? The legal system 
responds to 'irritations' on its boundaries with other sub-systems by 'an 
intensified (because it is far from entirely new) fragmentation and dispersal 
of law - what is usually referred to innocently as specialization' (p. 187). 
Law becomes just another management science. 'Whereas in the past admin-
istration took the form of adjudication, today law increasingly tends to take 
the form of administration' (p. 187). But law's reaction, Murphy says, need 
not be only reactive. With its obsessive focus on the individual, law can 
perform the role of conscience to the other sub-systems. It can irritate them 
as well. Law thus has the salutary effect of 'carv[ing] out an ethical space' 
(p. 197). It proyides the energy behind ' the moralization of society' (p. 201). 
None the less, law's fundamental claim, that it knows society and masters 
it, remains unsatisfied. Murphy's law is in mourning. 
Murphy's mistake is to ignore the contribution law makes to the creation 
of its competitors, hence to underestimate law's capacity to respond to their 
needs. Changes in the way law knows preceded the changes Murphy fingers 
as the cause of law's estrangement from society. We can trace the positiviza-
tion of law to the seventeenth century, to the political and legal theory 
developing and sustaining the secular sphere that the Reformation began to 
establish in the sixteenth century. If an exemplary figure is needed, it is 
Hobbes. The positivization of society began only a century later, with the 
self-conscious, rational reflection on business methods introduced by the 
Scottish Enlightenment. The first theorist of law in modem society, the 
Baron de Montesquieu, was also the first theorist of statistical aggregates. 
Montesquieu recognized the fundamental relation between legal forms and 
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population density, and made this ·relation the theoretical bedrock of The 
Spirit of the Laws.2 
The positivization of the law led to the positivization of society by strictly 
limiting and defining the reach of state power. Unlike 'the penetrative 
scheme' of the Christian commonwealth, Hobbes's absolute sovereign cares 
only that the legal person stay within the hedgerows marked out by the law. 
Within that space, the person is unaccountable.3 Nor does the sovereign treat 
the person as a 'juridical soul', whose education and correction is the main 
goal of the Christian commonwealth. Rather, persons are like cattle, animals 
to be controlled. The sovereign is interested in the person's interior life only 
to the degree that it presages action, not in itself. Hobbes's model of mastery 
is thus far more modest than the mastery sought by the Christian common-
wealth. It is limited in scope, to external behavior, and limited in space, to 
the fields of activity the sovereign chooses to control. From here, the posi-
tivization of society is but a short step, the institution of 'Systems Subject, 
Political, and Private' ,4 where the iron laws of political economy replace the 
civil law of the sovereign as the well from which all power is drawn. 
Hobbes's main point is that the person's freedom would be impossible 
without this peculiar sovereign. His sovereign creates the conditions for 
activities in which the sovereign has no interest and scarcely knows. But that 
is the very aim of Hobbes's commonwealth. His sovereign seeks estrange-
ment from society. Society is law's excess. Self-estrangement is the sign and 
seal of modern law. Indeed, in a different key, it is possible to show that 
self-estrangement is also the sign and seal of law in the Christian common-
wealth, of any sort of law. Far from being an affront to law's logic, the 
positivization of society is its very core. 
Murphy is right that law's estrangement has become more pronounced in 
our century. But legal theorists and practicing lawyers have been busy 
reworking doctrine and methods to track social developments. The class 
action, statistical proof, and virtual representation are some of the proce-
dural devices lawyers have used to master the issues of mass industrial 
society. Yet law continues to be the source of the empowerment of persons, 
as it was for Hobbes. Legal feminism and anti-discrimination laws in the 
United States of America are but two examples. Rights-based jurisprudence 
is the often overlooked premise of Hobbes's sovereign. 
Murphy's mistake, then, is to use an overly narrow definition of law, the 
one granted to him by his 'penetrative scheme'. Classical theorists maintained 
2 Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (tr. T. Nugent, 1949) especially ch. 23. 
Montesquieu also recognized the fundamentally statistical basis of knowledge, that knowl-
edge is information. This is expressed in his invention of the footnote, for which we all owe 
him a great debt. 
3 T. Hobbes, Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical 
and Civil [1651] (ed. M. Oakeshott, 1962) 165: 'The greatest liberty of subjects, dependeth 
on the silence of the law.'. 
4 id. , ch. 22. 
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that humanity is inconceivable without legality, that humans are creatures 
whose very identity and existence is a legal identity and a legal existence. 
Murphy denies that this is true any longer. He is wrong. 
ARTHUR J. JACOBSON 
Max Freund Professor of Litigation and Advocacy, Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law, Yeshiva University, 55 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 
10003, United States of America 
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